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CHAPTER 4




The impact of new technological innovations is all-pervasive today from alter-
ing consumer preferences in the direction of highly customized on-demand 
products to changing the way companies create, market, and deliver goods and 
services, in particular through increasing reliance on technology-enabled plat-
forms. Currently, digital technologies are changing the business model of com-
panies, especially in the banking and telecommunications sectors, while 
increasing efficiency and revealing new market opportunities. Even traditional 
industries increasingly employ methods for analyzing large volumes of data to 
make effective management decisions. The Internet of Things improves the 
quality of equipment operation, increases productivity of oil and gas fields, and 
makes urban infrastructure more energy efficient. In the next decade, the fur-
ther development of such innovations as unmanned aerial vehicles (drones), 
augmented reality, block chain, robotics, and artificial intelligence will open up 
a wide range of opportunities for consumers, business, and governments 
(Aptekman et al. 2017).
In Russia, the digital transformation of the economy is becoming one of the 
main strategic directions of its development (Jakutin 2017). In his address to 
the Federal Assembly in December 2016, President Putin set the task of pre-
paring a digital economy program. The President has repeatedly called atten-
tion to the challenges of Russia’s digital transformation, most notably in his 
speech at the St. Petersburg Economic Forum in June 2017. This provided an 
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impetus for the subsequent discussion of the digitalization strategy at various 
discussion platforms in Russia. Within a month, almost all major Russian busi-
ness associations and scientific communities held meetings, seminars, and con-
ferences on digital issues. The public discussions became the basis of the 
organizational work on the formation of a digital transformation strategy for 
the Russian economy in the government’s program (for more on digital gov-
ernment, see Chap. 3). Approved by the Presidential Council for Strategic 
Development and Priority Projects, the Digital Economy Program acquired 
the status of an official government document already in July 2017. On July 
28, 2017, Prime Minister Medvedev signed a governmental order approving 
the program “Cifrovaâ èkonomika Rossijskoj Federacii” (Digital Economy of 
the Russian Federation).1 Subsequently, national projects in 12 areas of strate-
gic development were established.2 One of these is the national program 
“Digital Economy of the Russian Federation,” approved by the Presidential 
Council for Strategic Development and National Projects3 on December 24, 
2018 (Pasport 2018), and created on the basis of the Digital Economy 
Program (2017).
4.2  PuttIng “dIgItal” In PersPectIve: theorIes 
of technologIcal change
Despite the widespread use of the term “digital economy,” it remains a fuzzy 
and contradictory concept. It is usually understood as all types of economic 
activity based on digital technologies, including e-commerce, Internet services, 
electronic banking, entertainment, and others. However, it is not clear where 
the precise boundary between digital and “analog” economies is now 
(Grammatchikov 2017). Additionally, economists note the contradiction in 
the term itself, suggesting that in economics, all processes have long been 
described, diagnosed, and projected using digits/numbers (Jakutin 2017, 32; 
Ivanov and Malineckij 2017, 4).
Digital transformation of the economy occurs under the influence of inno-
vation waves (Aptekman et al. 2017, 21). The first wave of digital innovations, 
starting from the 1960s, involved automation of existing technologies and 
business processes. Starting from the mid-1990s, the rapid development of 
Internet technologies, mobile communications, social networks, and the emer-
gence of smartphones have led to the widespread use of technology by end 
consumers. In the broader scientific context, these innovation waves, or inter-
related radical breakthroughs, form a constellation of interdependent technol-
ogies defined as a technological revolution. Carlota Perez (2002, 2010) identifies 
five such revolutions since the initial Industrial Revolution in England. Each 
technological revolution is accompanied by a set of “best-practice” principles—




In Russian literature, digital transformation is often associated with the tran-
sition to the sixth technological order, or tehnologičeskij uklad (Glaz’ev 1993, 
2010). A technological order is defined as a complex of technologies character-
istic of a certain level of development of production. Each technological order 
encompasses a closed cycle from the extraction of primary resources to all 
stages of their processing to the production of products that meet the relevant 
level of public consumption (Rodionov et al. 2017, 80). In this framework, 
digital economy is understood as a form of economic organization of society, 
resulting from scientific and technological progress, aimed at creating greater 
value with the use of technology of the sixth technological order and enabling 
its long-term sustainable development (Rodionov et  al. 2017, 79). Digital 
transformation is conceptualized as the material embodiment of nano- and bio- 
technologies, artificial intelligence, the Internet of Things, robotics, and other 
modern technologies based on electronic devices (Jakutin 2017, 28). With 
regard to the Russian economy, its digital transformation is seen as part of a 
broader task of economic modernization, moving away from its raw-materials 
orientation.
4.3  russIa on the global dIgItal Market
There are a number of studies that seek to identify the leaders of the digital 
economy and calculate its share in the gross domestic product (GDP) of differ-
ent countries. According to the latest McKinsey study (Aptekman et al. 2017), 
Russia’s digital economy accounts for 3.9 percent of its GDP, compared to 
10.9% in the United States (US), 10% in China, and 8.2% in the European 
Union (EU, in 2015 prices). At the same time, digital transformation is one of 
the main factors of economic growth in Russia as well as globally. From 2011 
to 2015, the total volume of Russia’s digital economy increased by 59%, which 
means that it is currently growing at a rate that is 9 times faster than the coun-
try’s GDP. Based on this considerable growth potential, the study suggests that 
it is possible to triple the size of Russia’s digital economy by 2025 from the 
current 3.2 to 9.6 trillion rubles, which would bring Russia to the level of 
developed economies in terms of the relative share of digital economy in GDP 
(8–10%).
To assess Russia’s relative position on the global digital market, it is possible 
to use relevant international indices. The Networked Readiness Index, devel-
oped by the World Economic Forum, measures countries’ preparedness to reap 
the benefits of emerging technologies and to capitalize on the opportunities 
presented by the digital revolution (Baller et al. 2016). It is made up of four 
main categories—environment (political/regulatory and business/innova-
tion), readiness (measured by information and communication technologies 
(ICT) affordability, skills, and infrastructure), usage (individual, business, and 
government), and impact (economic and social). Russia ranks 41st in the 
Networked Readiness Index 2016, far behind the leading countries such as 
Singapore, Finland, Sweden, Norway, the United States, the Netherlands, 
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Switzerland, the United Kingdom, Luxembourg, and Japan. Russia’s relatively 
weak position in the ranking can be attributed to the gaps in the regulatory 
framework for the digital economy and the insufficiently favorable environ-
ment for innovation and doing business, and consequently, low ICT business 
usage (Programma 2017, 8).
Another relevant index is the International Digital Economy and Society 
Index (I-DESI) developed by the European Commission to measure the digi-
tal economy performance of EU28 Member States and the EU as a whole 
compared to 17 other countries (Wiseman et  al. 2018). It is a composite 
index that comprises 5 dimensions: connectivity, digital skills, citizen use of 
Internet, business technology integration, and digital public services. Based 
on this index, Russia lags behind the EU average but is still ahead of China, 
Chile, Mexico, Turkey, and Brazil (Wiseman et al. 2018, 14). Russia ranked 
above the EU average in terms of human capital (digital skills) but fell behind 
in the other 4 dimensions. It received the lowest rating among the 45 coun-
tries in the study in terms of overall connectivity and was ranked below the 
EU bottom 4  in terms of business technology integration (for more, see 
Chap. 13).
4.4  analysIs of the dIgItal econoMy PrograM: 
defInItIons, goals, and IndIcators
This section provides an analysis of the program’s content in terms of its defini-
tions, goals, and indicators. It focuses on the 2017 state program as a concep-
tual document laying the framework for the subsequent national program 
(2018), which is more target oriented. The analysis also shows how the broadly 
formulated goals of the original program have been redefined and fine-tuned 
in the 2018 national program with more concrete tasks, indicators, and mecha-
nisms of implementation.
4.4.1  Definition of the Digital Economy
The state program defines digital economy as “an economic activity, in which 
the key factor of production is data in the digital form” (Programma 2017, 
4–5). In classic economic theory, labor, capital, and raw materials are consid-
ered the main factors of production. In the context of innovative economy, 
technology and knowledge also play a key role in production. However, it is 
not clear why data in digital form should be considered the main factor of pro-
duction (Ivanov and Malineckij 2017, 6). The authors of the program provide 
the following explanation: “Currently data become a new asset, mainly due to 
their alternative value, that is, as data are used for new purposes and realization 
of new ideas” (Programma 2017, 5). At the same time, the program does not 
specify these new purposes. A related criticism is that “data in the digital form” 
do not define the essence of today’s digital economy since data have always 
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been used to describe and evaluate economic activity (Jakutin 2017, 32). A 
simpler and more straightforward definition of the digital economy would have 
been as an economy based on digital technologies. Consequently, strategic 
management of the digitalization processes of the Russian economy would 
entail, first, the management of the development of digital technologies and, 
second, the management of the processes of their deployment in the economic 
sphere (Jakutin 2017, 36).
4.4.2  Goals of the Programs
The 2017 program outlines its three main goals as follows. The first goal is 
“creation of the ecosystem of the digital economy of the Russian Federation,” 
which ensures effective interaction between business, scientific and educational 
community, the state, and Russian citizens. This goal is weakly formulated and 
can hardly claim the status of a long-term target of government activities on 
digitalization. The “Strategy for the Development of the Information Society 
in the Russian Federation for 2017–2030” defines the “ecosystem of the digital 
economy” as “a partnership of organizations ensuring the continuous interac-
tion of their technological platforms, applied Internet services, analytical sys-
tems, information systems of public authorities of the Russian Federation, 
organizations and citizens” (Strategiâ 2017, 5). Thus, the creation of the eco-
system of the digital economy entails the creation of “a partnership of organi-
zations.” However, a partnership is not the main element of the digital economy 
(Jakutin 2017, 41). Regardless of whether enterprises-owners of digital tech-
nologies, Internet portals, and servers form or do not form a partnership, the 
economy does not cease to be digital.
The second goal is defined as “the creation of necessary and sufficient insti-
tutional and infrastructural conditions, the removal of existing obstacles and 
restrictions for the creation and (or) development of high-tech businesses and 
the prevention of the emergence of new obstacles and restrictions both in tra-
ditional industries and in new industries and high-tech markets” (Programma 
2017, 2). This goal is too big and too compressed in its content. It can be 
subdivided into two separate strategic objectives: the formation of the institu-
tional environment of Russia’s digital economy and the creation of its 
infrastructure.
The third goal is increasing competitiveness of Russian industries and the 
economy as a whole on the global market. However, this goal cannot be con-
sidered one of the directions of digitalization. Competitiveness is itself a result 
of the development of the digital economy. While improving competitiveness 
is a necessary task, it requires an active and diverse economic policy. The pro-
gram lacks such a policy (Jakutin 2017, 45).
The national program “Digital Economy of the Russian Federation” (2018), 
developed on the basis of the 2017 program, redefines the goals as follows. 
The first goal is a three-fold increase in domestic spending on the development 
of the digital economy from all sources (by share in GDP) compared to 2017. 
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The second goal is “creating a sustainable and secure information and telecom-
munications infrastructure for high-speed transmission, processing and storage 
of large amounts of data that is accessible to all organizations and households.” 
The third goal is the use of predominantly domestic software by government 
agencies, local governments, and organizations. Thus, compared to the earlier 
program, the national digital economy program has more concrete goals. 
Consequently, the indicators have also been redefined accordingly. They are 
shown in Table 4.1.
The redefined and more concrete goals, with corresponding indicators, of 
the subsequent national program (2018) are a significant improvement on the 
original version of the program. In this regard, the shift from a very broadly 
formulated goal of creating the ecosystem of the digital economy to the more 
concrete objective of increasing domestic expenditures on the development of 
the digital economy, with fine-tuning of the necessary methodology, should be 
noted. Compared to the earlier version, the use of domestic software by gov-
ernment agencies is elevated to one of the main goals of the program. In the 
2017 program, these measures were addressed under the rubric of information 
security with corresponding indicators for decreasing the share of foreign ICT 
equipment and software in the purchases of federal and regional government 
authorities and state-owned enterprises (SOEs). The new program uses differ-
ent indicators for government bodies and SOEs but focuses exclusively on soft-
ware, omitting ICT equipment. In sum, the program has been revised so that 
Table 4.1 Main indicators of the national program “Digital Economy of the Russian 
Federation” (2018)
No. Program indicators 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024
1.1 Domestic spending on the development of 
the digital economy by share in GDP (%)
1.9 2.2 2.5 3.0 3.6 4.3 5.1
2.1 Share of households with broadband access 
to the Internet (%)
75 79 84 89 92 95 97
2.2 Share of socially significant infrastructure 
objects with broadband access to the 
Internet (%)
34.1 45.2 56.3 67.5 83.7 91.9 100
2.3 Availability of data processing centers in 
federal districts (quantity)
2 3 4 5 6 7 8
2.4 Russia’s share in the world volume of 
storage and data processing services (%)
– – 1.5 2 3 4 5
2.5 Average downtime of public information 
systems as a result of cyberattacks (hours)
65 48 24 18 12 6 1
3.1 Cost share of domestic software purchased 
and (or) rented by federal, regional, and 
other government authorities, %
>50 >60 >70 >75 >80 >85 >90
3.2 Cost share of domestic software purchased 
and (or) rented by state corporations and 
companies with state participation, %




there is a better fit between the goals, specific measures to be implemented, and 
target indicators. However, much of the original criticism regarding the lack of 
measures for streamlining the production of domestic ICT equipment remains 
valid. Similarly, there are no indications in the program that it is aimed at 
addressing import dependence in the component base of hardware or creating 
mechanisms to overcome the rigid sanctions regime applied to Russian high- 
tech companies (Jakutin 2017, 37).
4.4.3  Levels of the Digital Economy
According to the program, the digital economy comprises three levels: markets 
and industries, where the interaction of specific subjects (suppliers and con-
sumers of goods and services) takes place; platforms and technologies, where 
competencies for the development of markets and industries are formed; and 
environment that creates the conditions for the development of platforms and 
technologies and effective interaction of market actors and covers regulations, 
information infrastructure, personnel, and information security. The program 
focuses on “the two lower levels of the digital economy,” and specifically, the 
development of key institutions that create the conditions for the development 
of the digital economy (regulations, personnel and education, the formation of 
research and technological competencies) and basic infrastructural elements of 
the digital economy (information infrastructure and information security) 
(Programma 2017, 2–3).
The levels of the digital economy identified in the program do not corre-
spond to the traditional micro-, meso-, and macro-levels established in eco-
nomic theory (Jakutin 2017, 45). The first, “upper” level, according to the 
program, “markets and industries,” entails the interaction of specific subjects 
(suppliers and consumers of goods and services). In other words, it is the level 
of an enterprise or the micro-level. Referring to the micro-level as the “upper” 
level of the digital economy, the program puts established economic theory on 
its head. The two “lower” levels, according to the program, are platforms and 
technologies, and “the environment.”
The program states that it “focuses on the two lower levels of the digital 
economy” but in practice restricts itself to just one level, “the environment,” 
broken into two components—institutions and infrastructure (Programma 
2017, 2–3). The program thus sees the basic directions of creating the digital 
economy as the development of various institutions and infrastructure. Omitted 
in this statement of objectives is the digital economy itself, or to use the pro-
gram’s terminology, the entire second level—digital platforms and technolo-
gies. This omission is remarkable considering that the digital platform is 
generally recognized as the building block of the digital economy. It is defined 
as the system of algorithmic relationships of a significant number of market 
participants, united by a single information environment, which reduces trans-
action costs due to the use of a package of digital technologies and changes in 
the division of labor (Jakutin 2017, 47). The digital platform, thus, can 
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rightfully claim the status of the main “level” of the digital economy, without 
any reservations about the second, third or lower levels.
4.4.4  Cross-Cutting Technologies
The program provides support for the development of “cross-cutting” tech-
nologies but does not offer a definition of this term. Nine technologies fall 
within the scope of the program, specifically, big data, neurotechnology and 
artificial intelligence, distributed registry systems, quantum technologies, new 
production technologies, industrial Internet, components of robotics and sen-
sorics, wireless technology, and virtual and augmented reality technology 
(Programma 2017, 3). The list of technologies will be updated as new tech-
nologies emerge and develop. The program will also be supplemented with 
relevant sections and road maps in the process of the implementation of specific 
measures in the field of health, creation of “smart cities,” and public 
administration.
In the words of former Minister of Telecom and Mass Communications, 
Nikolaj Nikiforov, who presented the program at a meeting of the Council on 
Strategic Development and Priority Projects, cross-cutting technologies is 
“when a digital technology is developed once and can be used many times in 
various industries” (Zasedanie 2017). However, the program does not specify 
an economic mechanism that makes these technologies “cross-cutting.” If the 
technology was “once” developed by someone, what is the mechanism that 
will allow this technology to “get away” from its owner and find its “cross- 
cutting” application “in various industries”? Jakutin (2017, 50) raises a num-
ber of valid questions in this regard: Who will pay for it? Who will ensure its 
distribution? What about copyright and intellectual property rights? The state 
program does not provide any answers to these questions. The choice of the 
nine “cross-cutting” technologies listed in the program is likewise arbitrary. 
According to Sneps-Sneppe et al. (2018, 38), the nine cross-cutting technolo-
gies identified in the program represent a random collection of modern tech-
nologies, and hardly the most important ones. Furthermore, it is difficult to 
notice the manifestation of these technologies in the program.
Compared to the original version of the program, the revised national pro-
gram (2018) represents an improvement in terms of introducing a number of 
concrete measures for the development of “cross-cutting” technologies, which 
are incorporated into the new federal project “Digital technologies.” These 
measures are aimed at achieving the goal of the national program to increase 
domestic expenditures on the digital economy and include (1) the creation of 
“cross-cutting” digital technologies predominantly on the basis of domestic 
research and development (R&D) and (2) the creation of an integrated system 
of financing projects for the development and implementation of digital tech-
nologies and platform solutions, including venture financing and other devel-
opment institutions. The first objective encompasses a range of policies such as 
designing road maps for the development of promising cross-cutting digital 
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technologies, creation of digital platforms for conducting R&D in these tech-
nologies, support of Russian high-tech companies, which develop products, 
services and platform solutions on the basis of cross-cutting technologies for 
the digital transformation of priority industries, and forming demand for 
Russian digital technologies, products and platform solutions, in part by 
launching digital transformation of state corporations and companies with state 
participation.
4.5  russIa’s dIgItal econoMy PrograM: 
ManageMent systeM
The program’s management system can be characterized as flexible, with mul-
tiple centers of decision-making (Sneps-Sneppe et  al. 2018; Ivanov and 
Malineckij 2017). In governance studies, a system with multiple semi- 
autonomous decision centers operating under an overarching set of rules is 
defined as polycentricity (Aligica and Tarko 2012; Carlisle and Gruby 2017). 
Despite the number of advantages ascribed to polycentric governance systems, 
including suitability for managing complex areas such as science, the concept 
of polycentricity has not been systematically applied in the study of innovation 
systems or science governance. This is somewhat surprising considering that 
the literature on science governance in Russia has framed the issue in terms of 
decentralization. At the same time, this literature acknowledges that the virtues 
of a decentralized science system are far from obvious in Russia or elsewhere 
since “[t]he best science is unapologetically elitist” (Graham and Dezhina 
2008, vii). This section will briefly review these debates on the organization 
and support of science in Russia in the context of the Digital Economy 
Program. The objective is to assess the extent to which its management system 
resembles or differs from a polycentric structure by exploring its main attri-
butes. These are: (1) the multiplicity of decision centers; (2) an overarching 
system of rules; and (3) a spontaneous order created by evolutionary competi-
tion between the various decision centers’ ideas (Aligica and Tarko 2012, 254).
4.5.1  Multiple Decision Centers
The most striking aspect of the program’s management system is the multiplic-
ity of decision centers and the range of participants involved in the program’s 
development and implementation. The governmental commission for the use 
of information technologies to improve the quality of life and the conditions of 
doing business is responsible for the overall control over the implementation of 
the Digital Economy Program (Postanovlenie 2017). Its Sub-Commission for 
digital economy is in charge of reviewing action plans and monitoring their 
implementation, approving methodological recommendations and regulations 
as well as resolving disagreements between participants and reviewing contra-
dictions in draft laws. Relevant ministries oversee their own areas.4 The Ministry 
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of Digital Development, Communications and Mass Media of the Russian 
Federation oversees the formation of research and technological competen-
cies,5 information infrastructure, and security while the Ministry of Economic 
Development administers regulatory, personnel, and educational policy. 1.8 
trillion rubles will be spent in 2019–2024 on the implementation of the 
national program for the development of the digital economy. More than 1 
trillion of these funds will be allocated from the federal budget (Pasport 
2018, 75).6
The Analytical Center for the Government of the Russian Federation acts as 
the project management office for the implementation of the Digital Economy 
Program. It provides organizational and methodological support for the imple-
mentation of the program, including the preparation of guidelines for the 
development of action plans and reports on their implementation. The Center 
also provides information and analytical support for the activities of the Sub- 
Commission and ensures the operation of a system of electronic interaction of 
the program’s participants.
An autonomous non-profit organization (ANO) Digital Economy coordi-
nates the participation of expert and business community in the implementa-
tion, development, and evaluation of the program’s effectiveness. Created by 
Russian high-tech companies (Yandex, Mail.Ru Group, Rambler & Co, Rostec, 
Rosatom, Sberbank, Rostelecom, the Skolkovo Foundation, the Agency for 
Strategic Initiatives, and others), the organization functions as a platform for 
state-business dialogue. It forms and coordinates the activities of working 
groups and competence centers for the program’s areas and evaluates the over-
all implementation of the program. In addition to ensuring the interaction 
with business and scientific community, its functions include support of digital 
technology start-ups and small/medium-sized enterprises (SME) as well as 
foresight and digital development forecasts.
Working groups prepare proposals for action plans and participate in evalu-
ating the effectiveness of their implementation. Competence centers are 
responsible for the preparation and implementation of action plans. The ANO 
Digital Economy initially comprised working groups and competence centers 
in the following five areas: information infrastructure; formation of research 
and technological competencies; personnel and education; regulation; and 
information security. State corporations Rosatom and Rostech served as com-
petence centers for the formation of research and technological competencies 
while Russian Venture Company headed the working group in this area. 
Russia’s state nuclear corporation, Rosatom, oversaw the development of new 
production technologies, big data, virtual and augmented reality technologies, 
and quantum technologies. State corporation Rostec, which promotes the 
development, production and export of high-technology industrial products 
for civil and defense sectors, was responsible for the development of neurotech-
nology and artificial intelligence, industrial Internet, robotics and sensor com-
ponents, wireless technology, and distributed registry systems (Sistema 2017). 
The competence centers and leaders of working groups for the other four areas 
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were the Skolkovo Foundation/MTS (regulation), the Agency for Strategic 
Initiatives/1C Company (personnel), Rostelecom/MegaFon (infrastructure), 
and Sberbank/InfoWatch (security).
4.5.2  A Single System of Rules
The Russian government has made consistent efforts to develop an overarch-
ing set of rules governing the dissemination and use of information technolo-
gies in different spheres and to coordinate the various digitalization programs 
and initiatives within a comprehensive system of strategic planning. Thus, the 
Digital Economy Program is closely linked to the documents already in force 
on the strategic development of the Russian economy (Programma 2017, 4). 
It complements the goals and objectives of the National Technology Initiative 
and the adopted strategic planning documents, specifically the Forecast of 
Scientific and Technological Development of the Russian Federation for the 
Period until 2030, the Strategy for the Scientific and Technological 
Development of the Russian Federation (2016), the Strategy for the 
Development of the Information Society in the Russian Federation for 
2017–2030, the priority project “Improving the organization of medical care 
through the introduction of information technologies” (2016), and other doc-
uments, including those of the Eurasian Economic Union. The adopted strate-
gic planning documents provide for measures aimed at stimulating the 
development of digital technologies and their use in various sectors of the 
economy. For example, the adopted socio-economic development forecast of 
the Russian Federation envisions the active dissemination and widespread use 
of information technologies in the socio-economic sphere, public administra-
tion, and business (for more, see Chap. 3).
The Strategy for the Development of the Information Society in the Russian 
Federation for 2017–2030 is the closest strategic document to the Digital 
Economy Program in terms of content, with the goals of the Strategy being 
closely related to the program (Programma 2017, 4). Based on the Strategy, 
the program also takes into account its founding acts and legislative frame-
work. These include the Federal Law No. 172-FZ “O strategičeskom planirova-
nii v Rossijskoj Federacii” (On Strategic Planning in the Russian Federation, 
2014), “Strategiâ nacional’noj bezopasnosti Rossijskoj Federacii” (National 
Security Strategy of the Russian Federation, 2015), “Doktrina informacionnoj 
bezopasnosti Rossijskoj Federacii” (Information Security Doctrine of the Russian 
Federation, 2016) as well as related legal acts that determine the direction of 
the application of ICTs in Russia (Jakutin 2017, 30–31).
4.5.3  A Spontaneous Order?
Despite the existence of multiple decision-making centers and an evolving 
overarching system of rules governing digitalization—key attributes of poly-
centric governance—the nature of the order generated by this system is 
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ambiguous and remains a subject of controversy. At the heart of this contro-
versy is the question of whether the program’s management system represents 
a move toward a more effective decentralized system of science governance or 
a step toward further bureaucratization of science. Theoretically, this question 
revolves around the nature of entry into the system—free, meritocratic, or 
spontaneous (Aligica and Tarko 2012, 254). Practically, the respective debate 
in Russia has centered on the role of the Russian Academy of Sciences (RAS) 
in overseeing digitalization.
The critics of the Digital Economy Program have been quick to note the 
absence of scientific organizations in its management system. They emphasize 
that the RAS, the main scientific organization responsible for determining 
research areas, including in the field of ICT, is not included in the management 
and implementation of the program. The absence of scientific organizations in 
the program’s management system is seen as evidence of an established post- 
Soviet trend of technological development without the involvement of domes-
tic scientific community (Ivanov and Malineckij 2017). The criticism goes 
further by suggesting that the program’s flexible management system with 
multiple centers of decision making is ill suited for governing science in Russia. 
According to Ivanov and Malineckij (2017, 11), such an approach has been 
tried before and proven ineffective in managing Russia’s scientific and techno-
logical complex. It leads to the growth of the bureaucratic apparatus and 
increases its costs while reducing the quality of policy.
An alternative view suggests that the absence of the RAS in the govern-
ment’s digital economy programs and initiatives is not coincidental, and that 
the Academy has traditionally been dismissive of Information Technologies 
(IT) professionals. As a result, information technologies were “pushed out” 
from the RAS. Currently, only a few IT sectors are represented in the RAS such 
as supercomputer computing and onboard software. According to Gorbunov- 
Posadov (2018), the academy cannot keep up with the pace of development of 
the IT industry, which puts its capacity to function as a universal body of 
national scientific expertise into question.
These opposing views were reflected in the controversial RAS reform and its 
public perception. The reform, launched in 2013, originally envisaged the dis-
solution of the RAS, which caused a negative reaction in scientific circles and 
led to a wave of protests across Russia. Without going into the details of the 
reform process, it suffices to note that significant changes in the management 
system of Russian science were made in 2018. The Ministry of Science and 
Higher Education of the Russian Federation was established in May 2018, with 
all institutes of the RAS subsequently falling under its jurisdiction. Amendments 
to the Law on Science and the Law on the RAS redefined and strengthened the 
role of the academy in the management system of Russian science. Specifically, 
the changes reaffirmed a key role of the RAS in the design and implementation 
of Russia’s scientific and technological development strategy (Mehanik 2019).
Pursuant to the Decree of the Government of the Russian Federation No. 
16 of January 17, 2018, the Ministry of Science and Higher Education formed 
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Councils in seven priority areas of scientific and technological development of 
the Russian Federation (IMEMO 2019). The first priority area and the name 
of the corresponding Council is “transition to digital, intelligent production 
technologies, robotic systems, new materials and methods of design, creation 
of big data processing systems, machine learning and artificial intelligence.” Its 
functions include formulating and monitoring of scientific and technological 
programs and projects in this area as well as providing expert and analytical 
support for the implementation of Russia’s scientific and technological devel-
opment priorities. Among the members of the Council are academicians, rep-
resentatives of leading research centers and universities, big business, federal 
executive bodies, and state corporations (RAS 2018).
Thus, the Council oversees digitalization within the framework of the 
Strategy for the Scientific and Technological Development of the Russian 
Federation but is far from the only institution responsible for the formation of 
Russia’s digital economy. Other programs and initiatives in this area include 
the Digital Economy Program and the National Technology Initiative, with 
their own teams and management systems. Additionally, most ministries have 
their own digitalization programs. Whereas critics insist that the duplication of 
functions and incontinency between various programs within this framework is 
a result of a poorly coordinated system of management (Chujkov 2019), it 
could also be argued that it is a result of a delicate compromise between the 
government, the RAS, and other stakeholders. Even though the role of the 
Academy has been strengthened, the existence of multiple decision-making 
centers prevents the monopolization of scientific expertise and allows competi-
tion between different ideas to take place. Thus, the polycentric structure of 
the Digital Economy Program’s management system is amplified on a broader 
scale of Russia’s digital economy governance where this program coexists with 
other digitalization initiatives.
4.6  crItIcIsM of the PrograM and Weaknesses 
of the governMent’s dIgItalIzatIon strategy
4.6.1  Imitation and Copying of Western Models
In the post-Soviet economy, the practice of borrowing ideas and approaches 
from foreign programs has become widespread. According to Ivanov and 
Malineckij (2017, 4), the Digital Economy Program, which is based on the 
recommendations of the World Economic Forum, was no exception. This 
copying of Western models inevitably affects the content and quality of the 
program. The emphasis is not on essential, critical matters but on external 
issues such as places in the ratings and keeping up with technological trends. 
Furthermore, the program does not proceed from the ability to produce new 
types of products but from the interests of a “qualified consumer.” In the 
broader sense, the common criticism of the program is that it does not deal 
4 RUSSIA’S DIGITAL ECONOMY PROGRAM: AN EFFECTIVE STRATEGY… 
66
with the economy as such or, more precisely, changing the technological base, 
which would lead to socio-economic transformations. The program focuses 
predominantly on the development of key institutions and infrastructure of the 
digital economy while “practically nothing is said about production, distribu-
tion or consumption” (Ivanov and Malineckij 2017, 4). As Loginov (2017) 
notes, “a lot and even too much is said about the ‘digital’ and practically noth-
ing about the ‘economy.’” The program does not provide a clear answer as to 
how the “digital” would fit into the economy.
The fallacy of the catch-up logic of the program is highlighted by the gov-
ernment’s expert council in their conclusion on the program’s first draft. The 
goal of the program, according to the expert council, was not to advance 
Russia’s development but rather to raise the digitalization level of its economy 
to the current level of developed countries by 2025. This means that by that 
time Russia will need a new program for the development of the digital econ-
omy, since one of the fundamental characteristics of the ICT sphere is the rapid 
introduction of new technologies, the emergence of which cannot be foreseen 
today (Demidov 2017).
4.6.2  Emphasis on Services to the Detriment of Production
Since the program is implicitly aimed at raising the digitalization level of the 
Russian economy to that of developed countries, it makes sense to briefly 
examine the industries and services that comprise the high-tech sector in devel-
oped economies. The US statistics, for example, distinguishes five high-tech 
manufacturing industries—pharmaceutical industry, semiconductor manufac-
turing, production of scientific and measuring equipment, production of com-
munication equipment, and aerospace industry. The foundation of all these 
industries is electronics (Ivanov and Malineckij 2017, 8). There are also five 
service industries that comprise the high-tech sector of the US economy—
business, financial, and communication services, education, and healthcare. 
Looking at the Digital Economy Program from this perspective, it is possible 
to conclude that it is focused on service industries while neglecting the high- 
tech manufacturing sector, the development of which is blocked in Russia.
One of the main criticisms of the program is that it does not provide mea-
sures for the development of Russian electronic components and systems (èle-
mentnaâ komponentnaâ baza). At the same time, many of the program’s 
objectives require the development of electronic components (Loginov 2017). 
Specifically, the digital transformation of industry, or Industry 4.0, cannot 
occur without a national technological base, including the industry of domestic 
micromechanics and nanoelectronics (Sitnikov 2017). Micro-Electro 
Mechanical Systems (MEMS) top the list of technologies necessary for the 
development of Industry 4.0. In Russia, these technologies are developed 
within the framework of Rusnano’s programs.7 Critics consider them ineffec-
tive, lamenting that Russia still has “ancient” technological competencies at the 
level of classical mechanics and limited laser processing capabilities. That is, it 
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is capable of producing parts with an accuracy of 0.1 mm on its equipment 
whereas the standard for global leaders in this field is 0.0001 mm.
One possible initiative in this regard could be the creation of a national 5G 
network based on Russian equipment (Loginov 2017). However, the pro-
gram’s activities in this field are limited to “assessing the capabilities” of the 
domestic industry to produce telecommunications equipment. As Loginov 
(2017) accurately points out, the domestic capabilities of building 4G net-
works were already assessed in 2011, but as a result, the networks were mod-
ernized using Chinese equipment. The program includes a number of target 
indicators for the development of domestic telecommunications industry, spe-
cifically increasing the share of domestic products in the purchases of software 
by federal and regional executive bodies and state-owned companies. However, 
in the absence of concrete measures for the revival of Russian telecommunica-
tions industry, it is unlikely that the program will meet these targets (Sneps- 
Sneppe et al. 2018, 39).
4.6.3  Preservation of Technological Dependence
Most of the communications equipment and software in Russia is of foreign 
origin. Russia is critically dependent on the import of IT equipment (from 80% 
to 100% for various categories) and software (about 75%) (Aptekman et  al. 
2017, 43). In 2016, the volume of sales of smartphones in Russia amounted to 
about 30 million units; the sales of personal computers—about 5 million units. 
The share of products of Russian manufacturers, which are built almost com-
pletely on the basis of foreign components, is miniscule in these volumes, just 
a few percent (Betelin 2017, 24). As another example, the networks of 
Rostelecom, Russia’s largest provider of digital services, have until recently 
been the arena of struggle between two American companies—Cisco Systems 
and Juniper Networks (Sneps-Sneppe et  al. 2018, 37). Rostelecom’s main 
project is a high-speed internet protocol (IP) network built entirely with the 
products developed by Juniper Networks.
The preservation of technological dependence runs counter to the Strategy 
of National Security and the Strategy for the Scientific and Technological 
Development of the Russian Federation (Ivanov and Malineckij 2017, 7). The 
critical dependence on imported components carries serious risks for the 
national security. It also blocks the development of many sectors of the domes-
tic industry. The existing experience of using borrowed solutions in microelec-
tronics indicates that Russian enterprises have access to technology and 
technical solutions with a lag of two or more generations, and the amount of 
payments for their use ranges from 30% to 80% of development costs and up to 
50% in mass production (Betelin 2017, 23). This is one of the main reasons 
why the semiconductor industry in Russia is not significant in economic or 
social terms. There is a risk that the implementation of the Digital Economy 
Program and the related National Technology Initiative will not lead to Russia 
gaining any significant share of the new global high-tech markets. Without 
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developing domestic electronics industry, the transition to the digital economy 
can be considered only in the context of purchases of electronic equipment 
abroad, including for defense and security. This would require addressing an 
additional problem of “non-declared capabilities” or the detection of hidden 
functions of the supplied equipment, permitting unauthorized control (Ivanov 
and Malineckij 2017, 8).
4.6.4  Lack of Scientific Support
One of the criticisms of the program’s management system is the absence of 
scientific organizations (Ivanov and Malineckij 2017, 11). With regard specifi-
cally to the ICT infrastructure, Sneps-Sneppe et  al. (2018, 41) note that 
Russian scientific research institutes, industrial science, and professional scien-
tists are not involved in addressing systemic issues of infrastructure develop-
ment and the preparation of relevant conceptual documents. The lack of 
scientific support adversely affects the quality of the program, which does not 
provide sufficient justification for the key role of the digital economy in ensur-
ing Russia’s economic leadership.
Available studies suggest that the products of the leaders of the global mar-
kets of semiconductors, electronic products, and software, such as INTEL, 
AMD, IBM, and Microsoft currently form the basis for the development of the 
digital economy (Betelin 2017, 24). In these conditions, the main risks and 
challenges for the formation of Russia’s digital economy stem from the lack of 
similar companies in Russia that carry proportionate economic and social 
weight. While the program envisions the creation of ten large high-tech com-
panies by 2024, it lacks actual measures for stimulating domestic electronics 
industry and relies on modernization of the communications network based on 
imported equipment. Such modernization efforts are likely to result in the 
reduction of the size of the digital economy in Russia rather than its growth 
(Loginov 2017).
Even though the Strategy for the Scientific and Technological Development 
of the Russian Federation (2016) defines the key role of Russian fundamental 
science in ensuring the country’s readiness for grand challenges and timely 
assessment of the risks associated with scientific and technological develop-
ment, in practice the program relies on the use of foreign scientific results and 
technologies (Strategija 2016; Ivanov and Malineckij 2017, 12). One of the 
stated objectives of the program is the creation of a support system for explor-
atory and applied research on the digital economy, which is supposed to ensure 
technological independence of each of the globally competitive cross-cutting 
technologies (Programma 2017, 11). However, relevant activities do not 
include basic (fundamental) research. Thus, the criticism of such an approach 
is that it cannot in principle ensure technological independence in ICT because 
new technologies can be created only on the basis of systematic results of 
exploratory and fundamental research (Ivanov and Malineckij 2017, 12).
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4.6.5  Lack of Reliable ICT Infrastructure
A number of studies note that the ICT infrastructure is relatively well devel-
oped in Russia, with digital services available for the majority of the country’s 
population (Aptekman et al. 2017, 36). On this basis, some analysts even point 
out that it is “completely unnecessary” for the government “to try to control 
or stimulate this process” (Loginov 2017). This view suggests that Russian 
telecom companies are able to deal with the infrastructural issues on their own, 
at the level of their commercial needs.
Sneps-Sneppe et al. (2018) offer an alternative point of view from the per-
spective of telecom professionals. The basis of information and communication 
infrastructure, the information space of any country, is the next-generation 
network (NGN), which provides a user with universal broadband access to an 
unlimited range of ICT services. Has such an infrastructure been developed in 
Russia, and who is building it? The construction of next-generation networks 
in Russia has been carried out by private capital to make a profit from providing 
access to the Internet and related services. This is done without taking into 
account the task of creating the foundation of the country’s digital infrastruc-
ture—a single telecommunications network of the Russian Federation, as 
required by the current law “O svâzi” (On Communications) and the interests 
of the state and society. The result, according to the authors, is the uncertainty 
of the architecture, location, and connectivity of the traffic exchange nodes of 
the composite network and the inability to manage it even in emergency situa-
tions. This “conglomerate of private fragments of the global Internet” cannot 
be used as an infrastructure for the networks that require high reliability and 
security of information exchange, which relates to the objectives of the Digital 
Economy Program (Sneps-Sneppe et al. 2018, 40–41). The ICT infrastructure 
cannot be developed solely on the commercial basis. It has to meet the needs 
of the state, governance, and national security, in addition to being an increas-
ingly important factor in improving the quality of life of the citizens.
Examining the Digital Economy Program from this perspective, it is possi-
ble to make the following observations. First, despite the emphasis on the 
infrastructure development in the program and the key role of Rostelecom in 
this area, the main efforts are aimed at the provision of new ICT services. The 
program’s activities do not include the development of technical means (Sneps- 
Sneppe et  al. 2018, 40). The program is oriented toward the spread of the 
Internet and higher-level tasks such as satellite communications and 5G net-
work without addressing the prior issue of the lack of a unified telecommunica-
tion network. Second, the risks associated with the ongoing modernization of 
private networks on the basis of next-generation technologies such as Software- 
Defined Networking (SDN), Network Function Virtualization (NFV), and 5G 
are not adequately addressed in the program. Third, the program focuses on 
the Internet, or regulation of IP packets, whereas the existing law “On 
Communications” is still oriented toward traditional networks and communi-
cation services. The actual meaning of such basic terms of the law as “federal 
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communications,” “a single (edinaâ) telecommunication network,” and “a 
public telecommunications network” has changed dramatically. To date, this 
has not been reflected in the legal framework and mechanisms for regulating 
the development of the domestic telecommunications sector (Sneps-Sneppe 
et al. 2018, 40). Despite the long list of measures in the program aimed at 
improving legal regulation of the digital economy, these specific problems of 
the current legal framework are not addressed.
4.7  conclusIon
The state program “Digital Economy of the Russian Federation” can be seen 
as the government’s latest attempt to approach the task of Russia’s moderniza-
tion in new technological conditions. For Russia to fully harness the economic 
and social benefits of the digital revolution, digital technologies have to become 
the key factor in the modernization of Russian industries as well as the creation 
of completely new industries and markets, which requires a targeted and sys-
temic state support based on a clear and coherent strategy. In this regard, the 
Digital Economy Program is an important milestone representing the Russian 
government’s concerted effort to envision the medium-term future of the digi-
tal economy in Russia and draft a comprehensive strategy in this area, even as 
it falls short in terms of its potential transformative effect on Russian industry.
Given the current state of development of domestic ICT equipment and 
software, the digitalization of Russian economy deserves the status of a strate-
gic task. Such a strategic orientation, especially in the broader context of a shift 
from the management of hydrocarbon exports to technology governance, is 
extremely important. At the same time, the experience of post-Soviet develop-
ment shows that the main problem lies not in ideas but in their implementa-
tion. One of the main reasons past economic initiatives were not successful is 
that they were made without sufficient scientific assessment based on very gen-
eral considerations (Ivanov and Malineckij 2017, 3). As the analysis shows, 
some of the same mistakes are repeated in the case of the Digital Economy 
Program.
Even though the program’s management system with its multiple decision 
centers and an evolving overarching system of rules governing digitalization 
resembles a polycentric structure, which in theory is suitable for managing 
complex areas such as science, the advantages of this system in Russia’s case 
seem questionable. Alternatively, more attention should be paid to the nature 
of entry into this system. At present, the multiplicity of decision centers in the 
program’s governance structure masks the insufficient involvement of scientific 
organizations, which is reflected in the program’s content. The lack of scientific 
support adversely affects the quality of the program, which does not justify the 
role of the digital economy in ensuring Russia’s economic leadership or pro-
vide measures for stimulating domestic electronics industry.
Although the Strategy for the Scientific and Technological Development 
defines the key role of Russian fundamental science in the assessment of 
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challenges associated with scientific and technological development, in practice 
the program relies on foreign scientific results and technologies. Thus, the 
government attempts to address an important technological problem without 
using domestic scientific potential. This affects the content and quality of the 
program, which proceeds from the interests of a “qualified consumer” and 
focuses on the spread of the Internet and provision of new ICT services while 
neglecting the critical state of Russian electronic components and systemic 
issues of ICT infrastructure development.
The program is too concise and general, and consequently, does not provide 
sufficient justification for the key role of the digital economy in ensuring 
Russia’s economic leadership or allow an adequate assessment of possible risks 
and challenges. The program defines multiple target indicators but does not 
provide evidence that the achievement of these indicators will reduce Russia’s 
technological gap with leading countries. Furthermore, it lacks actual measures 
for stimulating domestic electronics industry and relies on the modernization 
of the communications network based on imported equipment. The critical 
dependence on imported components blocks the development of many sectors 
of the domestic industry and runs counter to the Strategy of National Security 
and the Strategy for the Scientific and Technological Development of the 
Russian Federation. Without developing domestic electronics industry, the 
transition to the digital economy can be considered only in the context of pur-
chases of electronic equipment abroad, which is likely to result in the reduction 
of the size of the digital economy in Russia rather than its growth.
notes
1. Unless otherwise noted, all translations are author’s own.
2. Presidential Decree No. 204 of May 7, 2018 “O nacional’nyh celâh i strategičeskih 
zadačah razvitiâ Rossijskoj Federacii na period do 2024 goda” (On the national 
goals and strategic objectives of development of the Russian Federation for the 
period up to 2024).
3. On July 19, 2018, the Council for Strategic Development and Priority Projects 
was reorganized into the Council for Strategic Development and National 
Projects (“Ob uporâdočenii” 2018).
4. The Digital Economy Program (2017) had five areas. In the process of its trans-
formation into the national program (2018), the areas became federal projects 
and their number increased to six.
5. This area was changed to “Digital Technologies” in the national program. The 
federal project “Digital Public Administration” was also added to the areas over-
seen by the Ministry of Digital Development, Communications and Mass Media 
(Pasport 2018).
6. ICT analysts see this amount of funding as insufficient (Ustinova 2019). The 
largest amount of funds is allocated to information infrastructure whereas the 
funding of regulation and information security is quite modest. The final budget 
of the national program is also smaller compared to earlier estimates of 3.5 trillion 
rubles in total funding (Posypkina and Balenko 2018).
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7. Rusnano was the largest investor in SiTime, “an industry leader in development 
of MEMS-based high-performance oscillators and silicon timing solutions” that 
was acquired by Megachips in October 2014 (Rusnano 2011; Yoshida 2014).
references
Aligica, Paul D., and Vlad Tarko. 2012. Polycentricity: From Polanyi to Ostrom, and 
Beyond. Governance: An International Journal of Policy, Administration, and 
Institutions 25 (2): 237–262. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0491.2011.01550.x.
Aptekman, Aleksandr, Vadim Kalabin, Vitaliy Klintsov, Elena Kuznetsova, Vladimir 
Kulagin, and Igor Yasenovets. 2017. Cifrovaâ Rossiâ: novaâ real’nost’ [Digital 
Russia: A New Reality]. Digital McKinsey report. https://www.mckinsey.com/
ru/~/media/McKinsey/Locations/Europe%20and%20Middle%20East/Russia/
Our%20Insights/Digital%20Russia/Digital-Russia-report.ashx.
Baller, Silja, Soumitra Dutta, and Bruno Lanvin, eds. 2016. The Global Information 
Technology Report 2016: Innovating in the Digital Economy. World 
Economic Forum. https://www.weforum.org/reports/the-global-information- 
technology-report-2016.
Betelin, Vladimir. 2017. Cifrovaâ èkonomika: navâzannye prioritety i real’nye vyzovy 
[Digital Economy: Imposed Priorities and Real Challenges]. Gosudarstvennyj audit. 
Pravo. Èkonomika [State Audit. Law. Economy] 3–4: 22–25.
Carlisle, Keith, and Rebecca L. Gruby. 2017. Polycentric Systems of Governance: A 
Theoretical Model for the Commons. Policy Studies Journal. https://doi.
org/10.1111/psj.12212.
Chujkov, Aleksandr. 2019. Haos cifrovogo pravitel’stva [Digital Government Chaos]. 
Argumenty nedeli [Arguments of the Week], February 7. http://www.ras.ru/news/
shownews.aspx?id=9fbb7ef8-7731-4734-8391-63670e4e39b9.
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siteta [Polytechnic University Publishing House], 68–93. 
4 RUSSIA’S DIGITAL ECONOMY PROGRAM: AN EFFECTIVE STRATEGY… 
74
Rusnano. 2011. RUSNANO Invests in MEMS.  May 31. https://en.rusnano.com/
press-centre/news/88550.
“Sistema upravleniâ realizaciej programmy ‘Cifrovaâ èkonomika Rossijskoj Federacii’ 
[The Management System of the Program ‘Digital Economy of the Russian 
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“Strategiâ naučno-tehnologičeskogo razvitiâ Rossijskoj Federacii [Strategy for the 
Scientific and Technological Development of the Russian Federation].” 2016. Ukaz 
Prezidenta Rossijskoj Federacii [Decree of the President of the Russian Federation] 
No. 642, December 1. http://kremlin.ru/acts/bank/41449.
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